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$ The primary objective of this study is to explore the extent to 
which ERM implementation is capable of enhancing shareholders’ wealth. 
A sample of 283 companies operating in the Main Market of Bursa 
Malaysia was selected. This study utilized the definition of ERM as the 
independent variable and shareholders’ wealth as dependent variable. The 
overall observation revealed that ERM was significant in explaining the 
variation in shareholders’ wealth. Objective setting, event identification, 
risk response, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring substantiated the hypothesized relationship. The research 
framework of this study, which utilized assumptions from stewardship and 
agency theory, could serve as guidance for future research on 
organizational control and governance.  The study fills the gap in literature 
which mostly concentrated on the USA and western countries. The CRO 
and the board should focus more advising functions at the earlier stage of 







In light of the rising incidence of corporate financial scandals, regulatory agencies around 
the world have struggled to focus on strengthening measures to prevent further corporate 
collapses arising from mismanagement or unexpected financial surprises. Analysts have 
suggested that ERM could offer a safety net against these types of unexpected surprises [1, 
2]. The primary objective of ERM is to create, protect, and enhance shareholders’ value by 
managing the uncertainties surrounding the achievement of the organization’s objectives 
[3]. ERM could be one of the alternative governance tools to be deployed to protect 
companies from a wide range of exposures to risk [4].  
 Currently, the majority of studies on ERM have concentrated on the USA and western 
countries and little is known about ERM in other geographical locations, particularly Asia. 
This present study aims to bridge the gap in literature by empirically investigating ERM 
implementation in Malaysia. In its early stage, ERM implementation in Malaysia was 
mostly driven by consultants; thus, such implementation was lacking in empirical evidence. 
In this regard, the adoption of ERM in Malaysia could be attributable either to the influence 
of a general trend or alternatively to legislation imposing on firms an obligation to 
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implement an ERM. Considering the fact that Malaysian listed issuers have started to 
invest in ERM, it is of paramount importance to shed light on the simple yet critical 
question that may be contemplated by stakeholders: does ERM implementation improve 
shareholders’ wealth? Therefore, the primary objective of this study was to explore the 
extent to which ERM implementation is capable of enhancing shareholders’ wealth, thus 
providing them with a reason for investment in ERM beyond mere fulfilment of the 




The COSO suggested eight components of an integrated ERM framework: 1) internal 
environment, 2) objective setting, 3) event identification, 4) risk assessment, 5) risk 
response, 6) control activities, 7) information and communication, and 8) monitoring. The 
main criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of ERM is to measure the extent to which the 
eight components of the framework are executed. To date, studies providing empirical 
evidence of the impact of ERM implementation on financial performance are in their 
infancy [5-9]. The need for more research is critical considering the current tendency of 
regulatory authorities to shift their attention to ERM. Indeed, advocates of ERM have 
claimed that ERM is capable of enhancing shareholders’ wealth; nevertheless, there have 
been mixed results surrounding this significant claim. Earlier ERM literature reported 
favorable impact of the ERM implementation such as those studies by [3, 5, 9-17]. 
 It is interesting to note that ERM practice has evolved over the years and, since 2010, 
the focus has shifted from mere announcement of implementation of ERM to the 
appointment of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) with responsibility for oversight and regulatory 
compliance. Studies [18, 19] found that the existence of the CRO related to reduction in the 
volatility of stock prices. The involvement of CRO was also reported to positively 
influence firm value [5]. It is possible that, over the years, ERM implementation has 
reached maturity, as recent studies have started to reveal more consistent sets of results on 
the impact of ERM on organizations. Study [20] suggested that firms demonstrated 
progressively higher value as the ERM matured. Further, study [21] suggested that the use 
of a dedicated risk manager is capable of improving the firm’s operating performance and 
emphasized that the existence of a direct reporting line from the risk manager to the board 
or CEO could lead to superior firm value. 
 The fact that most of the existing studies concentrated on the USA and western 
countries obviously created a gap in the literature. Interesting, there are two studies from 
Malaysia that could shed light on ERM implementation in a different geographical setting. 
Studies  [22, 23] generally discovered that ERM was not the main factor leading to value 
creation and  that ERM implementation was not a significant variable in predicting 
variations in financial performance. This finding, in fact, contradicted all the previous 
studies, which reported a connection between ERM and shareholders’ value. These 
empirical findings provide interesting grounds for further investigation as they are contrary 
both to the objective of ERM as highlighted by the COSO [24] and to various existing 
studies. These contradictory findings should not be ignored as the world was taken by 
surprise by the USA credit crisis which occurred in late 2008 and it is possible that the 
future will yield ever more shocking financial crises. 
 Remarkably, a recent study on ERM in China substantiated previous ERM studies in 
the USA and western countries. Study [25], involving 254 Chinese non-financial state-
owned enterprises between 2006 and 2011, further confirmed the significance of ERM. 
They reported that ERM significantly increased firm value. More recent studies in ERM 
had incorporated corporate governance elements such as the board and senior executive 
management. Board was reported to be the most significance factor leading to an increase 
                                                              
 









in senior management involvement in risk oversights [26]. Study  [27] offers new insights 
in ERM literature by incorporating multi-theoretical approach utilizing a combination of 
institutional, agency resource dependency theory. Their study investigates maturity and 
board involvement in the ERM. It was reported that ERM matured firms tend to have more 
involvement from the board and senior management in the ERM monitoring task . The 
latest study [28] also incorporated various corporate governance attributes in an effort to 
understand ERM implementation among  Italian private firms. They had incorporated six 
control variables, namely, profitability, leverage, firm dimension and complexity, quality of 
external audit, corporate ownership and industry characteristics. They concluded that 




The implementation of ERM among Malaysian listed issuers is mandated by Bursa 
Malaysia’s Practice Note 9 [29] and Listing Requirements, paragraph 15.26 (b) and such 
requirement therefore validates the control mechanisms highlighted in agency theory. 
There is apparent justification for the notion that agency theory may be an appropriate tool 
for theorizing on the impact of ERM implementation on firm value [30].  
 Study [8] suggested that the use of agency theory is likely to simplify the complexity 
inherent in real business environments. Indeed, further review of the individual attributes of 
the COSO’s ERM framework revealed not only monitoring attributes but also advisory 
functions. In fact, seven out of the eight attributes of the ERM framework demanded a 
higher number of advisory than monitoring functions. Perhaps, the assumptions of 
stewardship theory provide a more satisfactory explanation of the advisory nature of the 
functions of the board and CRO in the context of successful implementation of ERM 
within an organization, particularly in the early stage of implementation.  With reference to 
monitoring, the gap left by stewardship theory could be perfectly covered by the 
assumptions by agency theory that supports monitoring of overall ERM implementation.  
 Based on existing literature, this study identified five firms’ specific attributes as 
control variables to overcome any undue influence on the ERM implementation. As the 
ERM is mandated for all listed companies in Malaysia, for the purpose of developing a 
comprehensive panoply of ERM tools, large firms may utilize greater financial resources 
than a small firm [27, 31-33]. Total revenue was used as proxy for firm size. The second 
and third control variables were the existence of a separate ERM unit and the existence of a 
CRO [5, 18, 19, 33]. Small firms may not be able to afford a dedicated department focusing 
on ERM. Instead, these small firms may have just a Chief Audit Executive (CAE) to 
oversee this function. This is not the ideal concept for a perfect ERM environment. At the 
other end, firms with a dedicated and well-structured ERM unit are often led by a CRO. 
The fourth control variable was the duration of the ERM implementation as a proxy for 
ERM maturity. Despite the mandatory requirement for ERM, not all listed firms had the 
same maturity or degree of ERM implementation. At the initial stage, firms may allocate 
most resources to educating staff and creating awareness of the ERM than on the design of 
an appropriate ERM framework. At the later stage, the focus inevitably shifts to the 
implementation of the ERM. Studies have revealed that mature firms demonstrate superior 
ERM implementation then less mature companies [27, 31, 32]. Finally, firms in different 
industries may be subject to different types and frequencies of risk; the varying level of risk 
thus served as one of the control variables. Generally, banking and financial institutions 
would be more exposed to various risks and would be more likely to have a more 
comprehensive ERM system. Existing literature reported that the degree of the ERM 
implementation is affected by industry classification [27, 28, 34, 35]. It is hypothesized 
that, upon controlling for the effect of the above control variables, significant relationships 
                                                              
 









would exist between ERM implementation and shareholders’ wealth, as measured by firm 
value [5, 6, 12], earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
[13, 14], and ROE [14]. The equation below depicts the hypothesized relationships. Figure 
1 summarizes the expected relationships between ERM implementation and shareholders’ 
wealth. 
  
Fig. 1. Expected relationships between ERM implementation and shareholders’ wealth 
+ 
 
The study utilized the definition of ERM and the framework proposed by the COSO [24] as 
the independent variable. A self-reported instrument was used to measure the degree of 
ERM implementation. The instrument was adopted  from [23]. The instrument also used 
unique measurement scales that enabled ratio data to be collected (as such data measure the 
degree of implementation or compliance with the COSO ERM framework). There were 
823 listed companies on Bursa Malaysia. Ideally a sample size of 263 companies should be 
sufficient for a satisfactory sample size. Considering the possibility of a lower response 
rate, a total of 823 copies of the questionnaires were distributed by mail to all the 
companies in the population. A copy with return paid envelope was mailed to the CRO for 
companies that had a Risk Management department/ unit; otherwise it was mailed to the 
CAE heading the Internal Audit department. The data collection procedure took place from 
December 17, 2014 to June 30, 2015. Significant efforts were devoted to ensuring the 
highest response rate via multiple emails and text messages. Eventually, 306 copies of the 
questionnaires were returned of which 23 copies were blank. A total of 269 copies were 
returned within the data collection period while another 14 surveys were received in July 
2015. Finally, the total number of respondent companies was 283. With regard to the 
dependent variable, firm value, EBITDA and ROE were the proxies used as a basis for 
measuring shareholders’ wealth were obtained from the Osiris database between July 1, 
2015 and July 31, 2015.  The data were extracted from the latest available financial data, 




                                                              
 










Y = α0 +γ1Xc1+ γ2Xc2+ γ3Xc3+ γ4Xc4+ γ5Xc5+ β1X1 +β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5  
+ β6X6+ β7X7+ β8X8+ є 




• Firm Value 
• EBITDA 
• ROE 
Degree of ERM Implementation  
(COSO Framework) 
Independent Variables Dependent  Variables 
X1 - Internal Environment  
X2 - Objective Setting 
X3 - Event Identification 
X4 - Risk Assessment 
X5 - Risk Response 
X6 - Control Activities 
X7 – Infor. and Comm. 
X8 - Monitoring 
 
Control Variables 
XC1 – Total Revenue 
XC2 – Existence of Separate ERM  
XC3 – Existence of CRO 
XC4 – ERM maturity 
XC5 – Industry Classification 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Definition Frequency Percent 
Industry class 
Banking, insurance and financial 
institution 
118 41.7 
Plantation 17 6.0 
Construction 32 11.3 
Trading 60 21.2 
Automotive 56 19.8 
ERM maturity (Duration of the 
ERM) 
in the first year of the ERM 
implementation 
24 8.5 
in the 2-3 years of the ERM 
implementation 
167 59.0 
in the 4-5 years of the ERM 
implementation 
40 14.1 
beyond fifth years of ERM 
implementation 
52 18.4 
Separation of ERM unit separate ERM unit/ Department 230 81.3 no separate ERM unit 53 18.7 
Existence of CRO with CRO 224 79.2 without CRO 59 20.8 
, 

Table 1 depicts the respondents’ demographic information coupled with descriptive 
statistics of relevant variables.  All variables that were subject to multiple regressions were 
transformed using Inverse Distribution Function method. Factor analysis was performed, 
the results of which are presented in Table 2. There were eight components extracted 
(Varimax with Kaiser Normalization, suppressed at 0.50) and factor scores from each were 
used to test the hypothesized relationships. Each factor was then named accordingly.  
Factor 1 was termed Monitoring, Factor 2—Event Identification, Factor 3—Information 
and Communication, Factor 4—Objective Setting, Factor 5—Risk Response, Factor 6—
Risk Assessment, Factor 7—Control Activities and Factor 8—Internal Environment.  The 
factors were then rearranged to reflect the sequence in the COSO ERM framework. 
 
Table 2. Factor Analysis 
Panel A: KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .935 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 14919.745 
Sig. .000 
Panel B: Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ERM25_1) .716        
ERM30.1_1) .715        
ERM30.2_1) .689        
ERM26_1) .641        
ERM27_1) .630        
ERM30.3_1) .625        
ERM28_1) .594        
ERM6_1) .565        
ERM1_1)  .761       
ERM11_1)  .706       
ERM14_1)  .643       
ERM2_1)  .624       
ERM9_1)  .583       
                                                              
 









ERM20_1)  .559       
ERM12_1)  .513       
ERM23_1)   .865      
ERM22_1)   .826      
ERM24_1)   .787      
ERM21_1)   .725      
ERM29_1)   .544      
ERM7_1)    .661     
ERM8_1)    .650     
ERM5_1)    .601     
ERM15.2_1)    .527     
ERM18.2_1)     .765    
ERM18.3_1)     .744    
ERM18.1_1)     .679    
ERM18.4_1)     .632    
ERM15.1_1)      .759   
ERM15.3_1)      .647   
ERM15.4_1)      .511   
ERM16_1)       .710  
ERM17_1)       .608  
ERM3_1)        .798 
ERM4_1)        .510 
ERM10_1)        .501 
  
 Table 3 depicts the results of the hierarchical multiple regressions on the hypothesized 
relationships. Multiple analyses were performed to substitute different measures or proxies 
for shareholders’ wealth. There were five control variables in the analyses – 1) Total 
Revenue, 2) existence of separate ERM unit, 3) Existence of CRO, 4) ERM maturity, and 
5) Industry Classification. The overall observation revealed that ERM was significant in 
explaining the variation in shareholders’ wealth. With reference to firm value, X2 – 
Objective Setting (coeff. 881.576, p-value 0.045), X3– Event Identification (coeff. 
95.947, p-value 0.040), X5 – Risk Response (coeff. 1013.621, p-value 0.026), X6 – 
Control Activities (coeff. 944.610, p-value 0.037) and X7– Information and 
Communication (coeff. 1128.478, p-value 0.014) were among the ERM variables that 
reported significant direct/ positive relationships with firm value.  It is significant that, 
after controlling for the effect of five variables, all ERM variables reported positive 
relationships with firm value, thus supporting the hypothesized relationship that ERM 
implementation leads to better firm value. The second proxy utilized, EBITDA, revealed 
an interesting pattern of results.  X1 – Internal Environment and X2 – Objective Setting 
reported negative relationships with EBITDA. All other ERM variables ( X3–Event 
Identification, X4 – Risk Assessment, X5 – Risk Response, X6 – Control Activities, X7 
– Information and Communication and X8 – Monitoring) revealed positive relationships 
with EBITDA, though not at 0.05 levels of significance. The third measure of 
shareholders’ value, ROE, revealed four ERM variables reported significant relationships 
with ROE. X3 – Event Identification (coeff. 0.409, p-value 0.003), X5 – Risk Response 
(coeff. 0.093, p-value 0.032), X7 – Information and Communication (coeff. 0.204, p-
value 0.047) and X8 – Monitoring (coeff. 0.397, p-value 0.002). All other ERM variables 
reported mixed (positive and negative) relationships with ROE but not at 0.05 
significance levels. 
 The unique insignificance pattern of results for EBITDA certainly raised some 
concern. Most probably, this is due to the fact that majority (59 percent) of the 
respondent were in the 2-3 years period of the ERM implementation which reflect their 
ERM’s maturity. Perhaps the intended impact of the ERM on the primary business 
                                                              
 









operations is yet to be visualized. Interestingly, ERM seems to have a favorable impact 
on firm value and ROE. Two control variables reported a consistent pattern of results 
throughout the three regression analyses. XC1 – Total Revenue and XC5 – Industry 
Classification revealed to be significant variables capable of influencing the overall 
relationship between ERM variables and shareholders’ wealth. 
 
Table 3: Impact of ERM implementation on shareholders’ wealth 
Type of Observations Firm Value EBITDA  ROE  
Variables Coef. p-value VIF Coef. p-value VIF Coef. p-value VIF 
Constant 3055.083 .252  141.853 .690  1.961 .010*  
XC1 - Total Revenue 1.397 .000* 1.702 .121 .000* 1.702 .000 .000* 1.737 
XC2 - Separate ERM unit 1079.168 .437 1.657 137.428 .457 1.657 -.514 .214 1.826 
XC3 - Existence of CRO 1173.936 .401 1.823 162.210 .384 1.823 .160 .696 1.897 
XC4–ERM maturity -623.284 .254 1.206 4.298 .953 1.206 -.090 .590 1.532 
XC5 - Industry Class. -913.455 .010* 1.871 -127.441 .007* 1.871 -.409 .000* 1.861 
X1 - Internal Environment -7.770 .986 1.034 -3.226 .956 1.034 .080 .533 1.090 
X2 - Objective Setting 881.576 .045* 1.082 -42.898 .463 1.082 .168 .188 1.112 
X3 - Event Identification 95.947 .040* 1.203 22.278 .724 1.203 .409 .003* 1.185 
X4 - Risk Assessment  240.428 .601 1.145 70.267 .252 1.145 -.074 .577 1.141 
X5 - Risk Response 1013.621 .026* 1.126 38.443 .526 1.126 .093 .032* 1.130 
X6 - Control Activities 944.610 .037* 1.133 61.523 .306 1.133 -.140 .273 1.111 
X7 – Information and 
Comm. 
1128.478 .014* 1.139 34.133 .576 1.139 .204 .047* 1.304 
X8 - Monitoring 369.798 .412 1.102 2.236 .970 1.102 .397 .002* 1.118 
R .700 .528 .754
R² .490 .279 .568
Adj. R² .465 .244 .547
Std. Error of the estimate 7036.53136 937.77712 1.98414
R² change .038 .010 .043
F change 2.495 .468 3.288
Sig. F change .013 .878 .001
F value 19.741 7.934 26.532
p-value .000 .000 .000
* Significance at the 0.05 level 
- .					
	
The present results justified the dual-theoretical approach that combines stewardship and 
agency to theorize the relationships between the advising and control functions exercised 
by the CRO and board. One may argue that ERM itself is part of a set of external control 
mechanisms as it is mandated by regulatory agencies. Nevertheless, the implementation 
of ERM within an organization involves a combination of both advising and control 
functions. Evidently, overall results supported the hypothesized relationships and further 
substantiated recent studies on the significance of ERM in enhancing shareholders’ 
wealth [25, 27, 28, 31-33]. Specifically, the following ERM attributes reported 
significant positive impacts on shareholder’s wealth—objective setting, event 
identification, risk response, control activities, information and communication and 
monitoring. Though this study was conducted in a similar research setting to two earlier 
studies on ERM in Malaysia [22, 23], the present results interestingly failed to 
substantiate the findings of those two studies, particularly the fact that ERM did not have 
a significant influence on shareholders’ wealth. 
 Up until now, ERM literature concentrated on US and western countries; this study 
enriches the literature by offering fresh insights in different geographical settings. This 
study both provided much-needed empirical input concerning the extent and nature of ERM 
implementation and identified the theoretical foundation underlying ERM as a governance 
tool. Indeed, the implementation of ERM is capable of enhancing shareholders’ wealth. 
                                                              
 









The present study also substantiated the notion that the primary objective of ERM is to 
create, protect, and enhance shareholders’ wealth. It is hoped that the results of this study 
will enrich the current ERM literature. The results support the validity of a dual-theoretical 
construct based on stewardship and agency to theorize the dynamic interrelations between 
firms’ advising and control functions. It is anticipated that this study will shed light on and 
promote additional empirical studies to further test both its hypothesized relationships and 
its theoretical justifications. The results rationalized the mandatory requirements imposed 
by Bursa Malaysia [29] concerning the implementation of ERM. This study is among the 
very few empirical studies that utilized the COSO’s ERM framework to assess the degree 
of ERM implementation. Nonetheless, it was measured using self-reported questionnaires 
and hence is affected by various limitations commonly found in studies using self-reported 
instruments. The study relied solely on self-reported responses and failed to corroborate the 
results with alternative measures. Future studies may fruitfully explore alternative 
approaches to self-reported measures— such as those in studies  [5, 9, 31], while at the 
same time retaining a similar theoretical foundation.  
 This study chose to view ERM implementation as part of the firm’s advising and 
control functions based on stewardship and agency theory; thus, the board and CRO are 
assumed to be the primary entities responsible for the success of ERM implementation. 
Further, the CRO could lobby the board and CEO to incorporate elements of ERM into 
staff performance appraisals, thus indirectly forcing the staff to embrace the ERM 
philosophy in their daily business operations. A continuous education program across 
various units in the organization is an indispensable element of an ERM strategy. 
Ultimately, once the ERM philosophy has pervaded the organization’s daily routine, the 
CRO and the board will be able to visualize not only a significant improvement in business 
operations, but also an increase in shareholders’ wealth.  
/
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The ERM instrument utilized in this study is available upon request. Kindly contact the 
corresponding author: m.ariff@ajman.ac.ae 
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